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Shedding a new light in the coarse-graining scenario, in this contribution we came up with different
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a well-defined coarse-grained state. For doing
so, we had to break apart with the usual quantum channels perspective and assume a more decision-
theoretical posture. Broadly speaking, we reinterpret the coarse-graining problem in the language
of quantum state pooling, and by make an extensive use of the conditional quantum states toolkit
we have been able to derive more tangible conditions for the emergence of a compatible effective
coarse-grained state.
I. INTRODUCTION
Effective descriptions of complex systems are
spread everywhere we look at. From the very
known cases of thermodynamics [1] and statistical
physics [2, 3], passing through biological and chem-
ical models [4–8], and going all the way up to engi-
neering and economics problems [9–12], whenever we
are faced with a highly detailed, intricate system or
process we naturally try to come up with a simpler,
coarse-grained version for it. A version for which we
can still extract meaningful physical properties.
Take for instance the case of a heat machine, say
a steam engine. We do not have to solve loads and
loads of Schroedinger equations every time we want
to assemble a train engine. We do not have to take
into account the quantum microscopic details to talk
about how such an engine works [13]. We are sat-
isfied with the very coarse-grained description pro-
vided by thermodynamics, we can even foresee that
due to the heat released by the train wheels, the
trails may heat up, expand, and if not otherwise con-
sider break apart causing an accident. That would
be prohibitive if such coarse-grained description were
not the case.
Although we have been using simpler descriptions
for complex systems, there has not been a mathe-
matically rigorous prescription taking care of how
coarse-graining descriptions of quantum systems,
particularly quantum dynamics, end up matching
with our classical description of reality. It was to
fill this gap that the authors of Ref. [14] proposed
their toy model.
Overall, the model set up in Ref. [14] and further
explored in [15, 16] is a mathematical way to investi-
gate the possible appearing of an effective dynamics
arising from the lack, blur, or misrepresentation of
information about the underlying microscopic sys-
tem evolving through a closed, unitary dynamics U .
Making things precise, the authors modeled the lost
of information as a CPTP map [17, 18], and asked
for necessary and sufficient conditions for the exis-
tence of quantum channel Γ to be seen as the emer-
gent map. The only constraint being that Γ should
be compatible with the diagram describing the sce-
nario (see Fig. 1).
The compatibility they demand is algebraic and
must be seen as expressing the idea that coarse-
grained descriptions must still be meaningful and
representative of the system one wants to center at-
tention on. In a nutshell, for them a quantum chan-
nel Γ is an effective description, whenever the dia-
gram in Fig. 1 commutes.In here we will address the
problem in a slight different manner, though.
Although we keep up with a diagrammatic ap-
proach resembling that of Ref. [14], our contribution
switches from the algebraic commutativity demand
to a more decision-theoretical requisition. Interpret-
ing quantum states as degree of beliefs, or informa-
tion an agent has about a system of interest, we
will use the (quantum) state pooling task [19] to
frame in it the usual coarse-graining scenario. It is
exactly this changing of picture that allows us to
obtain more tangible necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for the existence of an accurate coarse-grained
state.
For doing so we also needed to change the way
we use the quantum formalism. Aligned with the
perspective put out by the authors of Refs. [19–21],
and regarding quantum theory as a framework for
Bayesian inference, we make an extensive use of the
conditional quantum states formalism. It is within
the intersection of decision-theoretical tasks with the
conditional quantum state approach that our contri-
bution fits in. Our main result is a clear example of
it.
We have subdivided the paper as follows: in Sec. II
we have put together all the information we feel nec-
essary for understanding our main results. The sce-
nario we want to describe is reviewed in Subsec. II A,
the mathematical formalism we will use as a tool is
introduced in Subsec. II B, and finally Subsec. II C
contains the decision-theoretical definitions and re-
sults we will use immediately in the next section.
Particularly, Subsec. II C makes a parallel between
classical and quantum definitions, and although we
will only use the quantum version of them, we think
it is more didactic to take this route as it creates
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2a better environment for learning new concepts we
usually are not exposed to in the field. Moving on,
rewriting the coarse-graining scenario as a decision-
theoretical task, Sec. III provides our main results.
Sec. IV wraps this paper up and contains our con-
clusions and discussions as well as possible further
works.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Coarse-Graining and effective dynamics
Inspired by the usual idea that even our best
macroscopic description for the world surrounding
us is nothing but an emergent, coarse-grained por-
trayal of what happens in the underlying microscopic
reality [1, 2, 22–30], the authors of Ref. [14] came
up with a mathematically well defined, toy model
exploring the rising of emergent, coarse-grained dy-
namics.
Although simple in its inner details, their model
was supposed to capture the main idea we bear in
mind when facing with collective, complex phenom-
ena in the sciences. The idea that in the absence of a
full description for a system, we ought to be able to
provide an effective one. Effective in the sense that
when ignoring part of the details we cannot keep
track of it is still meaningful, and also brings over
some sort of information.
Think of the usual undergrad thermodynamics,
where even though we do not know how to di-
agonalise the Hamiltonian for a gas of interacting
molecules, we still know –by coarse-graining some
details– how to build up trains, cars, steam-engines
and extract useful work from them. This permanent
loss of underlying details have not hindered us of do-
ing science, rather we have learned how to deal with
it phenomenologically [1].
The work in Ref. [14] was built upon these ideas,
and tried to frame them in a sort of a quantum-to-
classical paradigm. The main point there being that
of coming up with a macroscopic emergent descrip-
tion consistent, compatible with the microscopic un-
derlying unitary closed dynamics. Compatibility be-
tween macroscopic and microscopic descriptions was
their key point and it is this very concept we want
to explore from a different perspective here. To let
clear the distinction between what we mean and they
meant by compatible descriptions it is worthy to
quickly revisit their main arguments.
Initially assuming the lacking-of-details, or blur-
ring of information, as given by a completely positive
trace preserving (CPTP) map Λ : D(HD)→ D(Hd),
and the underlying microscopic dynamics given by
a unitary Ut : D(HD) → D(HD), the formalism
developed in Ref. [14] looked for the actual form
(when well-defined) assumed by the emergent dy-
FIG. 1: Coarse-graining diagram. Vertical arrows represent
loss, lacking or blurring of information. Lower horizontal
arrow represents the closed, unitary dynamics the system is
going through. Uppermost horizontal arrow frames the
emergent, perceptible, macroscopic dynamics.
namics Γt : D(Hd)→ D(Hd) such that the diagram
depicted in Fig. 1 commutes. The latter meaning
that the emergent dynamics Γt to be assigned must
obey the idea that experiencing first the underlying
Ut followed by Λ is the same that first experiencing
the coarse-graining and only then Γt.
In either case, these descriptions must agree one
another and output the same final state, as they
represent the same dynamics. The commutativity
of the diagram in Fig 1 responsible by their notion
of compatibility.
This brief exposition about the coarse-graining
scenario is more than enough for our purposes. For
more details, though, including discussions on the
existence of emergent maps, the reader should check
out references [14] and [31]. More concrete examples,
also going along the lines of the aforementioned ref-
erence, can be found in Refs. [15, 16, 32]. We shall
now definitively move on to the next topic.
B. A glimpse on quantum conditional states
We dedicate this bit for a quite brief introduc-
tion to the formalism of quantum conditional states.
This section should be thought of as a short compi-
lation of definitions and results involving a quantum
generalization for the usual notion of conditional
probability. Consequently, it is not our intention
to explore in-depth the formalism developed for the
authors in Refs. [19–21], rather, we only wanted to
provide to the reader few definitions we will make
extensive use in the subsequent sections.
Kicking this section off, we should say we adopt
here the philosophy put out by the authors in
Ref. [19], that of seeing the conditional states for-
malism as nothing but a tentative to treat quantum
theory as a generalization of the classical theory of
3(Bayesian) inference. Emphasizing, particularly the
causal neutrality of the latter. Overall, this is the
parallel we are also trying to draw here, and it is
the very notion of (Bayesian) conditioning that will
allows us to re-frame the coarse-scenario into the
picture of decision theory.
In the usual classical setting the most basic ob-
ject is nothing but a joint probability distribution
P(X,Y, ..., Z) describing an agent’s degrees of belief,
knowledge, or even information about a list of clas-
sical random variables X,Y, ..., Z. The latter might
represent different properties of a system in a given
instant of time, the same property of a system at dif-
ferent times, or even more elaborate, unusual things
like a list of mathematics axioms an agent wants to
assume as being either true or false. The fact of
the matter being that there is no interpretative con-
straints on what those classical random variables in
the list mean.
Seeking to achieve the same level of interpretative
freedom, whereas in the usual texts of quantum me-
chanics [17, 18, 33, 34] the most basic unit is the
concept of a quantum system, in the quantum con-
ditional states perspective [19, 20] the most basic
concept is that of a region. Broadly, an elementary
region is anything we want to model as quantum,
and attach to a Hilbert space. For example, while
in the conventional quantum approach the input and
output of a quantum channel are treated as being the
same system at two different instants of time, in the
conditional states formalism we would associate to
the same input and output two distinct elementary
regions: Hin and Hout, respectively. The composed
region being the tensor product Hin⊗Hout of these
elementary factors. We highly recommend Ref. [20]
for an in-depth, detailed explication.
Moving on, the parallel we want to set up is ba-
sically the following: within the conditional states
formalism classical random variables become quan-
tum systems, and probability distributions become
trace class operators –not necessarily positive– act-
ing on Hilbert spaces. For each elementary region A
we associate a Hilbert space HA. For a composite
region AB, with HA attached to A and HB to B, we
associate the tensor product HAB := HA⊗HB . The
information, knowledge, or degree of belief about
AB being described by an operator σAB on HAB .
Partial information coming through a composed de-
scription σAB is handled as it is in the classical case.
Whereas in the latter we marginalize summing over
the outcomes of a random variable
P(X) =
∑
y∈Out(Y )
P(X,Y = y), (1)
in the conditional states formalism we trace out the
system we do not want to take care of:
σA = TrB (σAB) ∈ D(HA). (2)
Finally, we demand that whenever A is meant to
be a elementary region, any state associated with it
must be positive, Mathematically:
σA ≥ 0, if A is an elementary region. (3)
This in turn implies that if σAB is the state associ-
ated with the composition of two elementary regions
A and B, each marginal state σA and σB must be a
positive operator, although σAB need not to be.
Another important aspect of classical probability
theory also meets its counterpart in the formalism
of conditional states. While classically, given two
classical variables X,Y the probability of X condi-
tioned, or given, Y is defined via
P(X = x|Y = y) := P(X = x, Y = y)
P(Y = y)
, (4)
in here we define:
σB|A := σAB ? σ
−1
A , (5)
as for the conditional state of B given A, where the
?−product is a non-commutative operation deeply
explored in Refs. [19–21] and defined as:
ΨAB ? ΦB := (1A ⊗ ΦB) 12 ΨAB(1A ⊗ ΦB) 12 . (6)
Although there are some limitations [19, 20], the
conditional states formalism is robust enough to
handle with correlations among classical and quan-
tum regions simultaneously. We wrap up this section
describing how to do it through what is called hybrid
states.
For a classical variable X we want to consider in
conjunction with a quantum region B, we associate
a Hilbert space HX together with a preferred basis
{|x〉}x∈Out(X). On the other hand, B is bounded
to a Hilbert space HB with no preferred structure.
The composed region being HXB = HX ⊗HB . Ad-
ditionally, we want to ensure that the classical re-
gion remains classical, so that not only there must
not exist entanglement between X and B but also
the reduced state shall be diagonal in the preferred
basis. Respecting these conditions, we define the
hybrid state between X and B to be:
σXB :=
∑
x∈Out(X)
|x〉〈x| ⊗ σX=x,B , (7)
where each σX=x,B is a positive operator acting on
HA. We refer to Ref. [20] for interesting examples
as well as an in-depth discussion of the limitations
imposed on the conditional states approach.
C. Compatibility and Pooling in a Nutshell
This subsection brings in and explores only that
definitions we need from decision theory. As a mat-
4ter of fact, we will restrict ourselves only to that ma-
terial that will be extensively used in the next sec-
tion in order to get new light on the coarse-graining
scenario. Ultimately, our main goal is to take seri-
ously and explore deeper that idea that the lower-
most path and the uppermost one (see Fig. 1) must
be compatible, somehow agreeing one another.
For the authors of Ref. [14], compatibility was ex-
pressed by demanding that the diagram depicted in
Fig. 1 commuted. Here, on the other hand, instead
of adopting such algebraic perspective, we will frame
the same problem within a different picture and
putting ourselves in the shoes of a Bayesian decision-
maker, we will show how the state pooling task might
also be useful to study emergent behaviours [27–29].
Adopting the general methodology to combine
states as developed in Ref. [19], and rather than try-
ing to come up with a universal, valid rule for all
situations, we will base our analysis on the very well
known and down-to-earth concept of Bayesian con-
ditioning [35]. Within this framework it is possible
to come up with quite natural definitions [19] for
what compatibility between probability assignment
means. This kind of argument is robust and does
not rely on ad-hoc methods to decide whether as-
signments might be regarded as being compatible.
Summing up, Bayesian conditioning seems to be the
best approach one might think of when putting the
coarse-graining scenario into the shoes of decision
theory [36].
For our purposes one particular task in decision
theory stands out, that of state pooling. In a nut-
shell, it is the task [19, 37–39] of combining dif-
ferent states assignments into a single assignment
accurately representing the beliefs, information, or
knowledge of the involved group of agents as a whole.
In practice, state pooling is the kind of problem
our politicians should face on a daily basis, as de-
cisions [40, 41] are ought to be made as a group and
conflict of preferences prevent all involved parts in
the group from maximize their objectives, or face the
world with their very own beliefs, simultaneously.
1. Compatibility
Before rigorously defining what we mean by state
pooling, we need first define what we mean by com-
patibility, or agreement. We will go through it su-
perficially over the following lines, but for a deeper,
detailed approach to the same topic we refer to [19].
In a nutshell, depending on the Bayesian perspective
one might adopt about probability theory, there ex-
ist two equivalent notions for classical compatibility:
Definition 1 (Objective Classical Compatibility).
Two probability assignments Q1(Y ) and Q2(Y ), over
a random variable Y , are compatible whenever it is
possible to find two random variables X1 and X2, a
joint probability distribution P(Y,X1, X2), and two
outcomes x1 ∈ Out(X1) and x2 ∈ Out(X2) such
that:
1. P(X1 = x1, X2 = x2) > 0;
2. Qi(Y = y) = P(Y = y|Xi = xi),
for all i ∈ {1, 2} and for all y ∈ Out(Y ).
Definition 2 (Subjective Quantum Compatibility).
Two probability assignments Q1(Y ) and Q2(Y ), over
a random variable Y , are compatible whenever it
is possible to find another random variable X and
a conditional distribution P(X|Y ) that both agents
agrees upon such that:
1.
∑
y∈Out(Y )P(X = x|Y = y)Qi(Y = y) > 0
for all x and for all i ∈ {1, 2};
2. P1(Y |X = x˜) = P2(Y |X = x˜), for some value
x˜ in Out(X), where
Pi(Y = y|X = x) := P(X = x|Y = y)Qi(Y = y)∑
y P(X = x|Y = y)Qi(Y = y)
.
(8)
Although Def. 1 and Def. 2 must be seen within
the scope of a Bayesian’s perspective of probability
theory, the former is objective-like in its form, in the
sense that it reflects the idea that objective agents
can only disagree about the assignment they attach
to a system if they have had experienced different
data (represented by X1 and X2) coming from the
system of interest. The latter, though, fits into the
subjective approach, and must be seen as saying that
agents ought to agree to each other when they can
jointly come up with a test (represented by X) and
a data-set (represented by P(X|Y )) such that there
is agreement between the two agents when they look
at their Bayesian update Pi(Y |X = x˜) for some par-
ticular value x˜.
The next theorem [19] connects the subjective and
objective perspectives, and consequently also justi-
fies our affirmation saying that they are nothing but
faces of the same coin:
Theorem 1. Q1(Y ) and Q2(Y ) are compatible, ei-
ther subjectively or objectively, if and only if
supp[Q1(Y )] ∩ supp[Q2(Y )] 6= 0. (9)
Before delving even deeper into a more general
version of compatibility, a little detour might be
pedagogic here. Exemplifying how Def. 1, and con-
sequently Def. 2, work and are useful for decid-
ing whether two distinct probability assignments are
compatible, we state the two following results:
5Proposition 2. Let Y be a binary random variable,
say Out(Y ) = {a, b}. Additionally, let Q1(Y ) =
(p, 1 − p) and Q2(Y ) = (q, 1 − q) be two distinct
probability assignments for Y . There is compatibil-
ity between Q1 and Q2 if, and only if, p 6= q and
p, q ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. The proof follows directly from Theorem 1.
As a matter of fact, suppose there is agreement be-
tweenQ1 and Q2, then supp[Q1(Y )]∩supp[Q2(Y )] 6=
0. If either p or q were equal to one, then one of the
cases would hold true:
• either Q1 = (1, 0) and Q2 = (0, 1)
• or Q1 = (0, 1) and Q2 = (1, 0).
In either case, Eq. (12) would prevent the existence
of agreement.
As for the other direction, suppose that p, q ∈
(0, 1). In this case, all the entries of the vectors
(p, 1 − p) and (q, 1 − q) are non-vanishing. Once
again, Thm 1 implies that Q1 and Q2 are indeed
compatible one another.
Proposition 3. Let Y be a discrete random vari-
able. If Q1(Y ) is the uniform distribution for Y ,
then any other probability assignment Q2(Y ) is com-
patible with Q1(Y ).
Proof. Once again, the proof is a direct by-product
of Thm. 1. It suffices to bear in mind that as
Q1 =
(
1
|Out(Y )| ,
1
|Out(Y )| , ...,
1
|Out(Y )|
)
, (10)
then the support of any other probability distribu-
tion must overlap with supp[Q1(Y )]. That com-
pletes the proof.
Next, the quantum version generalizing Def. 1 plus
Def. 2 and Thm. 1 is obtained via the hybrid states
technique we discuss in Subsec. II B. Leveraging the
concept of Bayesian condition we have got from this
approach it is straightforward to come up with two
other quantum definitions having the same interpre-
tation as the classical we discussed in the previous
paragraph, that is to say:
Definition 3 (Objective Quantum Compatibility).
Two assignments σ1B and σ
2
B, for a quantum region
B, are compatible whenever it is possible to find two
classical random variables X1 and X2, a hybrid state
ρX1X2B, and two outcomes x1 ∈ Out(X1) and x2 ∈
Out(X2) such that:
1. ρX1=x1,X2=x2 > 0;
2. σiB = ρB|Xi=xi ,
for all i ∈ {1, 2}.
Definition 4 (Subjective Quantum Compatibility).
Two assignments σ1B and σ
2
B, for a quantum region
B, are compatible whenever it is possible to find an-
other classical random variable X and a conditional
state ρX|B that both agents agrees upon such that:
1. TrB
(
ρX=x|BσiB
)
for all x and for all i ∈
{1, 2};
2. ρ1B|X=x˜ = ρ
2
B|X=x˜, for some value x˜ in
Out(X), where each ρiB|X=x is given by the
quantum Bayes’ rule [19]
ρiB|X=x˜ :=
ρX=x|B ? σiB
TrB
(
ρX=x|BσiB
) . (11)
As for the result connecting both quantum defini-
tions we have:
Theorem 4. σ1B and σ
2
B are compatible, either sub-
jectively or objectively, if and only if
supp[σ1B ] ∩ supp[σ2B ] 6= ∅, (12)
where ∩ denotes the geometric intersection.
2. State Pooling
Moving on, and getting back to the pooling task,
to come up with a state that all the agents can agree
on as being the assignment reflecting the views of the
group as whole, we may use –once again– the results
of Ref. [19].
For doing so, we will restrict ourselves to the case
of two agents, say Theo and Wanda, and assume that
initially these two agents agree on assigning the same
P(Y ) to Y . Additionally, employing the objective
perspective, we assume that the posterior difference
between agents’ assignments are due to having col-
lected different data, so that we model these extra
data by two random variables X1 and X2 accessed
respectively by Theo and Wanda. In this scenario
we can enunciate the following result:
Theorem 5. If a minimal sufficient statistics for
X1 w.r.t. Y and a minimal sufficient statistics for
X2 w.r.t. to Y are conditionally independent given
Y , then the pooled state Qpooled(Y ) is given by
Qpooled(Y ) = c
Q1(Y )Q2(Y )
P(Y )
, (13)
where c is a normalization constant, independent of
Y .
The quantum case is in complete analogy with the
classical scenario, although now ρB is the prior both
Wanda and Theo assigns to a system of interest, and
6both X1 and X2 are the classical random variables
representing the data the agents have acquired upon
learning from different interactions with the system.
With that in hands we can enunciate the following
solution for the quantum version of the pooling task.
Theorem 6. If a minimal sufficient statistics s1 for
X1 w.r.t. B and a minimal sufficient statistics s2 for
X2 w.r.t. to B satisfy:
ρs1(X1)s2(X2)|B = ρs1(X1)|Bρs2(X2)|B , (14)
then the pooled state σpooledB is given by
σpooledB = cσ
1
Bρ
−1
B σ
2
B , (15)
where c is a normalization constant, independent of
B.
We emphasize that in either case Thm. 5 and
Thm. 6 make explicit how to combine distinct as-
signments arising from potentially different interac-
tions with a system of interest. It is this recombina-
tion we will strongly use in the next section to say
what should be the effective dynamics coming from
a coarse-graining description.
III. EMERGENT DYNAMICS SEEN AS
AGREEMENT BETWEEN AGENTS
Now we have got in hands all necessary ingredi-
ents to address our major topic. We have taken a
long detour so far, so that it is pedagogical to re-
state our problem once again. In Ref. [14] the au-
thors sought what is the emergent dynamics, arising
from a coarse-graining, compatible with the diagram
in Fig. 1. Although well-motivated, their notion of
compatibility was highly algebraic, as it is expressed
by demanding commutativity of Fig. 1.
Here, on the other hand, we will frame the task of
finding that emergent dynamics into decision theo-
retical world, and additionally will also interpret the
compatibility demanded by the authors in Ref. [14]
through decision theoretical lenses. We feel this new
layout is manifold, as it not only brings over a new
perspective on the coarse-graining scenario, but also
opens up new points of contact between quantum in-
formation and decision theory. On the top of that,
the present work can also be seen as a direct ap-
plication of quantum conditional states [19, 20] for-
malism, which sets the problem addressed by the
authors of Ref. [14] also as an instance of (quantum)
causal inference.
Kicking it off, let us first re-draw the diagram de-
picted in Figure 1 in a way more adapted to our
purposes. Figure 2 captures the key points we want
to emphasize.
FIG. 2: New coarse-graining diagram. The dotted line
depicting a schematic distinction between what Wanda and
Theo experience. The pooled state represents the state the
two agents must agree on at the end of the process.
There two agents, say Wanda and Theo, have once
had the same prior, the same initial description, for
a quantum system ρB . After that, they went on and
potentially interacted differently with B. Think of it
as modeling access to different experimental devices
and potentially different measurements. Think of it
as if Wanda has got access to a defective detector, so
the data she collects represent an imperfect (and dis-
tinct from Theo’s) description of the system. Time
goes on, the system of interest then evolves, and now
is Theo who is (potentially) affected by an imperfect
measurement apparatus. Her final state σ2B and his
σ1B .
They are trying to infer physical properties from
the same system, undergoing the same evolution,
through potentially distinct and imperfect detectors,
though. When are their assigned states compat-
ible one another? When can they reconcile their
differences and assign one single state σpooledB –to
the quantum region B of interest– representing ac-
curately both agents’ beliefs? Summing up, when is
it the case that σ1B and σ
2
B agree with each other?
It is not always the case, though, that such com-
patibility will take place. Using the algebraic formal-
ism developed in Ref. [14], it is possible to engineer
simple scenarios, with underlying unitary dynam-
ics and very simple imperfections, where there is no
(algebraic) compatibility. We believe the same may
also happen here. On the other hand, what we want
to come up with here are necessary and sufficient
conditions for when such condition holds true.
The way we have set the task up fits perfectly
into the objective version of quantum state pooling
as expressed by Thm. 6. As a matter of fact, it is the
minimal sufficient statistics conditions that control
whether or not each agent’s interaction with differ-
ent data-sets will hinder them of assigning a single
pooled state at the very end. In other words, it is the
minimal sufficient statistics that says whether defec-
tive apparatuses will strongly impact each agent’s
view about the system. If so, the data the agents
7gather are so distinct from each other that by not
respecting the independence condition expressed in
Eq. (14) they cannot assigned a single state accu-
rately representing their world’s view.
Our main result can be expressed as follows:
Result 7. If a minimal sufficient statistics s1 for
X1 w.r.t. B and a minimal sufficient statistics s2 for
X2 w.r.t. to B satisfy the independence condition in
Eq. (14), then the pooled state σpooledB is given by
σpooledB = cσ
1
Bρ
−1
B σ
2
B , (16)
where c is a normalization constant, independent of
B.
It turns out that it is the very Eq. (16) that al-
lows us to express our main result as a mapping, and
consequently in a closer analogy to what has been
done in Ref. [14]. For each initial prior ρB there
is only one σ1B assigned by Wanda, and also only
one σ1B assigned by Theo. The particular details of
how each assignment has been done does not matter.
As long as they respect the minimality expressed by
Eq. (14), they could have originated out of a chan-
nel, from Bayesian condition or by any other means.
Additionally, if we can trace them back to ρB (for
expressing them as a function) while respecting the
independence-like condition in Eq. (14), our result
says that it is possible to define a map from D(HB)
onto itself given by:
Γ˜ : ρB 7→ cσ1Bρ−1B σ2B , (17)
where c is a normalization constant independent of
B. Due to the format of Eq. (17) we should empha-
size that although being well-defined, the assignment
map Γ˜ will be non-linear in general. Not only the
inverse of matrix does not distribute across the sum,
but σ1,2B is also highly dependent of the prior ρB .
Note that whereas in Ref. [14] the authors are fo-
cused on getting a quantum channel as the emergent
dynamics arising from the coarse-graining process,
in here on the other hand, the map we have just de-
fined is not restrict by such constraints. Within our
novel framework, it does not matter whether the as-
signed pooled state σpooledB can be seen as coming out
of quantum channel [17, 18, 42]. Our notion of com-
patibility has been expressed via decision-theoretical
arguments, and as long as the assigned state repre-
sents accurately the agents’ perspective, the formal-
ism works and we do not have to take into account
if this assignment has arisen from a completely pos-
itive trace preserving map [17, 18, 42]. This opens
up another route, with more freedom, to address the
coarse-graining problem.
IV. CONCLUSION
Trying to come up with a simple, mathematically
rigorous toy model to explain the emergence of non-
quantum dynamics, the authors of Ref. [14] explored
the paradigm of coarse-graining, as diagrammati-
cally depicted in Fig. 1. There they demanded that
the emergent, effective dynamics should be compat-
ible with the underlying diagram. The emergent dy-
namics should be such that the diagram commutes.
Putting aside the quantum channel language, and
implementing a decision theoretical perspective, in
this contribution we switched the notion of com-
patibility. Instead of asking for something purely
algebraic, we demanded the compatibility between
different descriptions were given in terms of a sort
of agreement between distinct probability assign-
ments. Broadly, whenever both agents agree on a
description accurately representing the information
they have gathered about a system of interest over
the time, we say that our compatibility notion has
been fulfilled. On top of that, we also say that the
state they have agreed upon is the coarse-grained
state. This latter understood as if arising as an
output and out of an emergent map, as shown in
Eq. (17). Our work, therefore, being a combination
of decision-theoretical ideas together with the condi-
tional quantum state approach. A path opened up
by the authors of [19] that we wanted to apply to
different situations, to get different results.
Within the original coarse-graining scenario the
authors pursed the path of trying to obtain neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for the emergence of
an effective dynamics. Although they did end up
proving conditions for the existence of such maps,
their result is not fully satisfactory, as it relies on
checking out an infinite number of semi-definite pro-
grams [43–45]. On the other hand, within our for-
malism, although we have departed from the usual
quantum information parlance, Result 7 shows how
it was possible to get more meaningful necessary and
sufficient conditions for the existence of a quantum
state representing the ideal final state arising from
a coarse-graining process.
The minimal sufficient statistics condition we de-
mand there may be seen as nothing but an inde-
pendence requirement, much in the molds of what
is usually done in causality [20, 46–49]. When-
ever such condition holds true, we can factorize the
pooled state σpooledB decomposing it in a product-like
form using as building blocks the agents’ descrip-
tions σ1B , σ
2
B and the shared prior ρB .
Although this relaxation escapes a bit from the
usual quantum-information paradigm, decision theo-
retical arguments are not new in the area and in con-
junction with the conditional quantum states toolkit
they have already brought over new insights on old
problems [19–21, 50–55] we have faced in the field.
8Exploring this synergy created by compatibility
and conditional quantum states formalism, connec-
tions with causality, steering and more general non-
locality scenarios are topics that should be explored
elsewhere. In particular, considering only the toolkit
arising from the conditional states, we might also
have approached the original coarse-graining prob-
lem from the usual perspective, so that the emergent
quantum channel would be defined through the in-
version of the first vertical arrow in the diagram (see
Fig. 1). We are already taking care of this case in
another work, though.
We feel this new framework is not only more in-
tuitive, but also provides more tangible necessary
and sufficient conditions for when it is possible to as-
sign a meaningful, accurate, effective state (assumed
here to be the pooled state) arising as output of the
coarse-graining problem.
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